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WORKPLACE BULLYING:  THE PROBLEM AND 
THE CURE 
Michael E. Chaplin* 
Michael:  “So the next day, my father went to see him, only this 
time with Luca Brasi.  Within an hour, he signed a release for a 
certified check of one thousand dollars.”  Kay:  “How did he do 
that?”  Michael:  “My father made him an offer he couldn’t 
refuse.”  Kay:  “What was that?”  Michael:  “Luca Brasi held a 
gun to his head, and my father assured him that either his brains 
or his signature would be on the contract.  That’s a true story.”1 
 Bullies, they’re everywhere.  We have all known one, many of us have 
worked for one, and some of us have been one.  We all remember the 
schoolyard bully, the “big” kid who picked on everyone, for fun, for power, 
for prestige.  We were told to ignore them because they were the bad kids, 
the lazy kids, the insecure kids, the kids who would never amount to 
anything in life.2  We were told wrong.3  The schoolyard bullies grew up, 
got good jobs, and continue to terrorize us.4 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Business Law, California State University, Northridge.  J.D., 
Magna Cum Laude, University of Notre Dame School of Law, 2000.  This article is 
dedicated to my father, Kenneth Chaplin.  As a boy my dad taught me, “Son, if you’re going 
up against someone bigger than you, even the odds!”  Good advice.  Thanks, Dad. 
 1. Jenny M. Jones, THE ANNOTATED GODFATHER 45-46 (2007). 
 2. See Brett Scharffs, The Role of Humility in Exercising Practical Wisdom, 32 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 127, 195 (1998) (“As on the school playground, bullies are often insecure.”). 
 3. See Mary Jo McGrath, SCHOOL BULLYING:  TOOLS FOR AVOIDING HARM AND 
LIABILITY 10 (2007) (“The commonly held assumption that bullies only appear tough but are 
really anxious and insecure is incorrect.  Studies of bullies as a group indicate the opposite: 
Most bullies have little anxiety and insecurity or are average in this area, and they do not 
have poor self esteem.  In fact, bullies often have a very positive self image.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Michael G. Harvey, Joyce T. Heames, R. Glenn Richey & Nancy 
Leonard, Bullying:  From the Playground to the Boardroom, 12 J. LEADERSHIP & ORG’L 
STUD. 1, 1 (2006) (“The unfortunate reality is that bullying is moving from the playground 
of our childhood, to the offices and boardrooms of our adult business arenas.”); John A. 
Mack, The Law of Bullying:  Off the Playground and Into the Workplace, 62 BENCH & B. 
MINN. 20, 20 (2005), available at 
http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2005/sep05/bullying.htm  (“Playground bullies grow 
up.  They leave behind the broken toys and bloodied noses of the sandlot in exchange for the 
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Workplace bullies.  They’re the worst of the bunch.  We spend a third 
of our life at work, often more.5  The workplace should be, if not pleasant, 
at least tolerable.  Instead, workplace bullying is a leading cause of 
violence in the workplace.6  We work, we want to work, but not with 
THEM, and not for THEM.  Bullying has reached “epidemic”7 proportions 
and is a “crippling and devastating problem with the potential to damage 
targets’ self-esteem, physical health, cognitive functioning, and emotional 
health.”8  Workplace bullying also causes substantial problems for the 
business organization, including “lost work time, decreased 
productivity, poor morale and loss of employees.”9  Now is the time to stop 
workplace bullying. 
This paper addresses the problems of, and potential solutions for, 
workplace bullying.  Section I examines the nature and problem of bullying 
in the workplace, noting the extent and cause of this destructive 
phenomenon.  Section II examines four potential legal remedies to the 
problem of workplace bullying, two legislative and two common law 
options, including a proposal for the creation of a new common law 
remedy. 
I. THE BULLY PROBLEM 
“I’ve got a gun out there in my purse and up ‘til now I’ve been 
forgiving and forgetting, ‘cuz that was the way I was brought up . 
. . . But I swear, you say one more word about me and I’ll get that 
gun of mine and I’ll change you from a rooster to a hen with one 
shot.”10 
 
broken pencils and bruised egos of the office.”). 
 5. Gregory J. Hare, Employee Participation Programs:  A Great Idea, But Are They 
Lawful?, 1991 DET. C. L. REV. 973, 1014 (1991) (“[M]ost adults spend almost one-third of 
their lives at work.”); Four Paths to Less Business Stress, ACHIEVING RESULTS IN A 
CHANGING WORLD (The Morse Group LLC), Dec. 2008, available at 
http://www.themorsegroup.net/newsletters/10Dec08-Stress.pdf (“We typically spend one-
third to one-half of our adult lives at work.”). 
 6. Carla Gonçalves Gouveia, From Laissez-Faire to Fair Play:  Workplace Violence 
& Psychological Harassment, 65 U.T. FAC. L. REV. 137, 141 (2007). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Pamela Lutgen-Sandvik, Sarah J. Tracy & Jess K. Alberts, Burned by Bullying in 
the American Workplace:  Prevalence, Perception, Degree and Impact, 44 J. MGMT. STUD. 
835, 838 (2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 9. William R. Corbett, The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 
BROOK. L. REV. 91, 99-100 (2003). 
 10. Jeff Lunden, Dolly Parton, WORKING ‘9 TO 5’ TO GET TO BROADWAY, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO, SEPT. 20, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=94823815 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2009). 
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A. Identifying the Bully Problem 
The right of every employee “to the protection . . . from . . . wrongful 
hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and 
worth of every human being – a concept at the root of any decent system of 
ordered liberty.”11  Yet, with few exceptions, employers may treat their 
employees as they see fit.12  To be sure, the law protects employees against 
statutorily recognized discrimination, but provides no protection against 
general workplace harassment.13  There is no requirement that the 
workplace be hospitable, or even civil.14  To the contrary, the employment 
relationship is more often akin to a battlefield than a place of ordered 
liberty.15  At the heart of this organizational dysfunction is the bully. 
i. Bullying – Its Prevalence & Impact 
In September 2007, The Workplace Bullying Institute, in cooperation 
with Zogby International, released a comprehensive survey (“Survey”) 
measuring the prevalence of workplace bullying in the United States.16  
Based on this survey of 7,740 online interviews, the following key 
 
 11. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966). 
 12. See, e.g., Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroad Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) 
(“All may dismiss their employees at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no 
cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.  A 
fortiori they may ‘threaten’ to discharge them without thereby doing an illegal act, per se.”), 
overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 544 (1915); Richard Michael 
Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 163, 183 (2007) (“A legal regime that prohibits employers from discriminating 
against employees, but—thanks in large measure to the employment-at-will rule—does not 
otherwise require them to treat their employees fairly, creates incentives for workplace 
practices that may ultimately undermine antidiscrimination goals and fairness norms 
alike.”). 
 13. See The Law of Bullying, 62 BENCH & B. MINN. 20, 22 (“Historically, employees 
had little legal recourse against bullying, unless they could tie the behavior to certain 
protected classes, such as gender or race.  In other words, if the boss is mean to everybody, 
he or she is not breaking the law.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Samoza v. Univ. of Denver, 513 F.3d 1206, 1219 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(affirming summary judgment “[d]espite the testimony that the Appellants endured various 
instances of incivility, rudeness, and allegedly offensive statements regarding their ethnicity 
and national origin”); Samuel A. Marcosson, Who is “Us” and Who is “Them” – Common 
Threads and the Discriminatory Cut-Off of Health Care Benefits for AIDS Under ERISA 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 361, 417 n.285 (“An employer 
may treat all its employees badly or unfairly, so long as it does so even-handedly.”). 
 15. Harvey et al., supra note 4, at 4 (“[A] manager at one of the nations leading 
wholesalers admitted to bullying saying, ‘It is me against them [the employees] and I am 
going to win or die trying.’”). 
 16. WORKPLACE BULLYING INST. & ZOGBY INT’L, U.S. WORKPLACE BULLYING SURVEY 
(2007), http://www.workplacebullying.org/res/N-N-Zogby2007.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 
2009). 
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observations were made regarding the extent of workplace bullying.17 
Thirty-seven percent of American workers, approximately 54,000,000 
workers have been bullied at work, and forty-nine percent of workers have 
been affected by workplace bullying, either through direct contact with the 
bully or by witnessing one or more bullying acts.18  This last point is 
particularly telling as to the extent of the problem.  While bullying has 
serious negative consequences for the bully’s victim (e.g., “high degree 
bullying may result in permanent psychological damage, post-traumatic 
stress disorder, increased risk of heart disease, and even suicide”),19 
secondary victims (e.g., those witnessing bullying at work) are also at risk, 
reporting “increased levels of ‘destabilizing forces at work, excessive 
workloads, role ambiguity and work relationship conflict.’”20 
The harm to secondary victims is compounded when they are forced 
into the bully’s web as active participants.21  This behavior is often referred 
to as “mobbing.”22 
Mobbing is an emotional assault.  It begins when an individual 
becomes the target of disrespectful and harmful behavior.  
Through innuendo, rumors, and public discrediting, a hostile 
environment is created in which one individual gathers others to 
willingly, or unwillingly, participate in continuous malevolent 
 
 17. Id.  (The Survey had a margin of error of +/- 1.1 percentage points.). 
 18. The Workplace Bullying Institute (WBI) defines bullying as “repeated, health-
harming mistreatment of one or more persons (the targets) by one or more perpetrators that 
takes one or more of the following forms:  [v]erbal abuse, [o]ffensive conduct/behaviors 
(including nonverbal) which are threatening, humiliating or intimidating, [w]ork 
interference – sabotage -- which prevents work from getting done.”  Workplace Bullying 
Inst., Definition of Workplace Bullying, Oct. 21, 2009, 
http://www.workplacebullying.org/targets/problem/definition.htm; see also, Lutgen-
Sandvik et al., supra note 8, at 854 (“Given the data available, we can speculate that 
approximately 35-50 percent of US workers experience one negative act at lease weekly in 
any 6-12 month period, and nearly 30 per cent experience at least two types of negativity 
frequently.”). 
 19. Lutgen-Sandvik et al., supra note 8, at 855; see also, Sarah J. Tracy, Pamela 
Lutgen-Sandvik, Jess K. Alberts, Nightmares, Demons, and Slaves:  Exploring the Painful 
Metaphors of Workplace Bullying, 20 MGMT. Q. 148, 153 (2006) (“Repeated abuse can 
result in emotional responses such as helplessness, anger, despair, and shock and health 
problems such as musculoskeletal complaints, sleep problems, chronic fatigue, and loss of 
strength.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 20. Lutgen-Sandvik et al., supra note 8, at 845 (quoting Dawn Jennifer, Helen Cowie, 
Katerina Ananiadou, Perceptions and Experience of Workplace Bullying in Five Different 
Working Populations, 29 AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 489, 495 (2003)). 
 21. See Lutgen-Sandvik et al., supra note 8, at 845 (“[S]econdary victims are 
‘employees who themselves were not violated but whose perception, fears and expectations 
are changed as a result of being vicariously exposed to violence.’”). 
 22. David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of “Workplace Bullying” and the Need for 
Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475, 481 (2000). 
CHAPLINFINALIZED_FOUR 3/31/2010  2:03:42 AM 
2010] WORKPLACE BULLYING 441 
 
actions to force a person out of the workplace.23 
It is no wonder, then, that “[t]argets of bullying at work anticipate the 
workday with dread and a sense of impending doom. . . . Privately, they are 
profoundly ashamed of being victimized and are confused at their apparent 
inability to fight back and protect themselves.”24 
Too often the business enterprise fails to take into account both the 
personal and organizational costs associated with bullying.  As a case in 
point, consider the employees interviewed at the “now defunct Scott Paper 
Company” who suggested that 
Al Dunlap’s (company CEO) bullying behavior was a key 
determinant in the failure of one of America’s top paper 
manufactures.  One interviewee noted; “You couldn’t look the 
guy in the eye for fear you would get fired or at least dressed 
down for no reason at all.  If I needed something to repair the 
equipment, I just rigged it or went without.  We kind of ‘half-
assed’ everything under his watch . . . we didn’t have a choice.”25 
While the costs are not always as dramatic as those faced by Scott, 
they are real, and very harmful: 
By beating down employees, change agents, and teams of 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Lutgen-Sandvik et al., supra note 8, at 837. 
 25. Harvey et al., supra note 4, at 3; see also, David C. Yamada, Employee Perceptions 
of Internal Conflict Management Programs & ADR Processes for Preventing & Resolving 
Incidents of Workplace Bullying:  Ethical Challenges for Decision-Makers in 
Organizations, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J 375, 377 (2004) (noting several examples of 
workplace bullying).  A first-hand recount of workplace bullying follows: 
One worker who is employed in a non-union setting describes his or her 
experience as follows:  “I worked at the [ABC Corporation]. The staff 
accountant was always mean, for no reason.  I would e-mail requests for info 
that she would never answer.  I would leave voicemails; she would never 
respond.  Finally, I reported her to my supervisor.  He told me that she was just 
moody like that and I should get over it.  I pushed and forced the issue, but to no 
avail.  One day I broke down crying because of the unfair treatment; I was sent 
home.  I called in the next day to request one more day off because of illness.  I 
was told not to come back, effective immediately.  I could not even clean out 
my own desk.  They had one of the other hateful employees take my belongings 
home for me to get from her.  I have not seen or heard from her since.”  Another 
surveyed worker describes as follows:  “I was humiliated by a co-worker at a 
prior job.  I was then yelled at or given the silent treatment by this same person 
who is White.  I am Asian.  I felt this treatment could have been racially 
motivated but I don’t know this for a fact.  This person gave preferential 
treatment to males and seemed to dislike females also.  I took this matter to my 
manager and eventually the president of this small company.  She was given a 
warning and took a leave of absence.  After this leave, things did not change 
and I left the company.  Never have I ever encountered this situation and felt it 
was undeserving and not dealt with properly.”  Id. at 377. 
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employees, bullies involuntarily transmit signals to potential 
future employees that the firm is not a good place to work.  
Consequently, the quality of the pool of applicants diminishes 
and the firm is forced to trade down on talent when selecting the 
best possible candidates for employment.26 
The consequent harm to the employment pool should serve as an 
alarm to corporate America.  Despite these operational costs, however, 
bullying is on the rise.27  So, why are bullies tolerated?  The simple answer 
is bullies are perceived as adding value to the organization.28  In fact, 
“targets of harassment are four times more likely to be fired than their 
bullying boss.”29  Eventually, “the bullied individual learns to ‘accept’ the 
aggression of the bully as a normal part of his or her job.”30  It seems that 
cultures, which encourage an environment of conflict under the belief that 
doing so increases the value of the organization considers the operational 
costs associated with bullying justified.31 
ii. Bullying – It’s Not Just a Matter of Civility 
Workplace bullying is, by and large, an outgrowth of the corporate 
 
 26. Harvey et al., supra note 4, at 3. 
 27. Id. at 2. 
 28. See Michael G. Harvey, M. Ronald Buckley, Joyce T. Heames, Robert Zinko, 
Robyn L. Brouer & Gerald R. Ferris, A Bully as an Archetypal Destructive Leader, 14 J. 
LEADERSHIP & ORGANIZATIONAL STUD., 117, 122 (“Career progress is oftentimes facilitated 
by these negative characteristics, almost as though the organization values self-promotion 
and the devaluation of others in the organization.”). 
 29. Jacquelynne M. Jordan, Little Red Reasonable Woman & the Big Bad Bully: 
Expansion of Title VII & the Larger Problem of Workplace Abuse, 13 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 621, 658 (2007) (citing GARY H. NAMIE, WORKPLACE BULLYING INSTITUTE, 
THE WBI 2003 REPORT ON ABUSIVE WORKPLACES 3 (2003), 
http://www.bullyinginstitute.org/res/2003results.pdf). 
 30. Harvey et al., supra note 28, at 122 (citation omitted); see also Tracy et. al., supra 
note 19, at 162 (“[S]ome targets became so exhausted and overwhelmed with the fight that 
they viewed bullying as uncontrollable nightmare.”). 
 31. See Allyce Bess, Whipping the Work Force Out of Shape, S.F. BUS. TIMES, July 16-
22, 1999, at 3, available at 
http://sanfrancisco.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/1999/07/19/story8.html (“Courts 
here have not generally accepted the argument that workers should be free from even 
abusive treatment at the hands of their bosses or coworkers.  Nor should they, argues Jeff 
Tannenbaum, a lawyer at San Francisco-based employment law firm Littler Mendelson.  
Tannenbaum asserts that the United States not only has more laws than it can handle, but 
that bullying has its benefits.  ‘This country was built by mean, aggressive, sons of bitches,’ 
said Tannenbaum.  ‘Would Microsoft have made so many millionaires if Bill Gates hadn’t 
been so aggressive?’  Tannenbaum says that inappropriate bullying is in the eye of the 
beholder.  Some people may need a little appropriate bullying in order to do a good job.  
Others assert that those who claim to be bullied are really just wimps who can’t handle a 
little constructive criticism.”). 
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values we most esteem.  “[B]ullying is not simply an interpersonal issue 
but is an organizational dynamic that impacts all who are exposed . . . .”32  
Until the business community is willing to address this problem on a 
structural level, or is otherwise forced to do so, there is little hope for 
institutional change.  The following rather crude example illustrates the 
daunting task of reforming the workplace: 
It seems obvious that a reasonable person would find two 
repeated requests by a supervisor to “flash your tits” to be 
offensive.  Then, having been told that the offender would be 
relieved of duty, instead the offender went unpunished and Ms. 
Pastula was transferred to a different crew where the hostile 
environment not only continued but worsened.  Mark Rowley 
made the statement 20-30 times that day, to Ms. Pastula and 
others, that “we’re not going to have titty Tuesday, we’re going 
to have pants down Wednesday.”  Mr. Rowley came up with new 
humiliating comments on a regular basis, and not a day would go 
by without someone making a crude remark.  Even the supervisor 
of that crew, Steve Rowley, made sexual and degrading 
comments about whether the crew had “gotten any skin” the 
night before. . . .  Only after Ms. Pastula reported the harassment 
to DOT officials and those officials called Lane [Construction] 
did Lane investigate and again, rather than punishing the 
harassers, Lane transferred Ms. Pastula to a different position.  
Shortly thereafter, Ms. Pastula was put back on Jeff Albee’s crew 
and was forced to ride separately to the job site and endure the 
ostracism of her co-workers.33 
Despite this protracted hostility, the court hesitated, noting that it had 
an obligation to “differentiate between potentially meritorious suits 
involving severely or pervasively hostile treatment and non-meritorious 
suits involving basic civility issues characterized by ‘isolated incidents,’ 
‘simple teasing’ or ‘mere offensive’ behavior.”34  In the end, the court 
found that 
[v]iewed objectively, the collection of offensive utterances that 
Pastula endured were not sufficiently serious to support a finding 
that Lane Construction Corporation subjected her to severe or 
pervasive sexual harassment in the workplace such as could 
reasonably be regarded as having effectuated a change in the 
terms and conditions of her employment.35 
 
 32. Lutgen-Sandvik et al., supra note 8, at 855. 
 33. Recommended Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment, Pastula v. Lane Constr. 
Corp., Civil No. 05-133-B-W, 2006 WL 2925239, at *9 (D. Me. October 11, 2006) (quoting 
the unpublished Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment). 
 34. Id. at *9. 
 35. Id. at *10 (citations omitted). 
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Similarly, courts have regularly refused to address the bully problem, 
noting that there is no legal cause of action for bullying.36  Thus, employees 
are left to suffer, and neither of the twin towers of legal recourse (the 
legislature and the judiciary) show any inclination to help.  Much of the 
problem stems from the mistaken assumption that bullying is merely a form 
of rudeness; that it is a matter of civil behavior, of mere manners and, as 
such, is not within the proper scope of court action.37 
This view demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the scope 
of the harm.  The act of bullying, while lacking civility, is not synonymous 
with incivility, although “bullying . . . usually include[s] acts of incivility 
and a sense of being victimized.”38  Bullying is not, as some have 
mistakenly assumed, merely a matter of “workplace manners.”39  Rather, 
“[i]ncivility could include simple rudeness, either in words or action.  
Interpersonal [conflict] involve[s] problems that le[a]d to arguments with 
[other] coworker[s].  Bullying involve[s] persistent criticism, yelling, 
spreading gossip, insults and ignoring or excluding workers from office 
activities.”40 
Incivility is expectable.  Bullying is not.  It is one thing not to say 
thank you, or please, or to snub a coworker.  While boorish, this behavior is 
not the full throated bullying that is targeted (i.e., intentional) and 
destructive to both the organization and the individual; it is not conduct that 
is “threatening, humiliating or intimidating . . . [w]ork interference—
sabotage—which prevents work from getting done.”41  A bully lacks 
 
 36. See, e.g., Yamada, supra note 22, at 478 (“Unfortunately, the growing body of 
statutory and common-law protections for workers—particularly status-based employment 
discrimination laws and tort claims for emotional distress—have not been effective against 
workplace bullying.”); see also Susan Harthill, Bullying in the Workplace:  Lessons From 
The United Kingdom, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 247, 248 (2008) (“[W]orkplace bullying . . . is a 
significant problem in the U.S. and yet has no legal remedy.”). 
 37. See Samoza v. Univ. of Denver, 513 F.3d 1206, 1219 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Despite the 
testimony that the Appellants endured various instances of incivility, rudeness, and 
allegedly offensive statements regarding their ethnicity and national origin [the] legal 
landscape of employment retaliation claims [has not changed] so as to create a ‘general 
civility code for the American workplace.’”). 
 38. Lutgen-Sandvik et al., supra note 8, at 841. 
 39. See Garry Mathiason & Olga Savage, Defining and Legislating Bullying, THE 
COMPLETE LAWYER, Jan.-Feb. 2008, available at 
http://www.workplacebullying.org/press/2008tcl4.html (examining workplace bullying and 
concluding “that courts are not the appropriate authority to regulate workplace manners”). 
 40. Meet the Work Bully, http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/11/meet-the-work-
bully/ (Mar. 11, 2008, 13:22 EST); see also, Tracy et. al., supra note 19, at 152 (“In contrast 
to workplace incivility, which is defined as low intensity deviant . . . behaviors [that] are 
characteristically rude and discourteous, displaying a lack regard for others, workplace 
bullying is escalated and can include screaming, cursing, spreading vicious rumors, 
destroying the target’s property or work product, excessive criticism, and sometimes hitting, 
slapping, and shoving.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted) (alterations in original). 
 41. THE WORKPLACE BULLYING INSTITUTE, DEFINITION OF WORKPLACE BULLYING, 
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civility and so much more. 
B. Defining The Bully Problem 
While there is no uniform definition of “workplace bullying,” the 
various working definitions are remarkably similar.  For example, the 
Workplace Bullying Institute has defined workplace bullying as “the 
repeated, malicious, health-endangering mistreatment of one employee . . . 
by one or more employees.”42  Other scholars have defined workplace 
bullying as “repeated offensive behavior [sic] through vindictive, cruel, 
malicious or humiliating attempts to undermine an individual or group of 
employees.”43  David Yamada, perhaps the foremost advocate of anti-
bullying legislation, defines workplace bullying as “the intentional 
infliction of a hostile work environment upon an employee by a coworker 
or coworkers, typically through a combination of verbal and nonverbal 
behaviors.”44 
Whichever definition one uses, two themes appear to be central:  (1) 
the bullying is intentional, and (2) the bulling activity is harmful, both 
personally (psychologically and/or physically) and professionally (the 
activity seriously hinders the target’s ability to effectively carry on his or 
her work-related duties).45 
 
http://www.workplacebullying.org/targets/problem/definition.html. 
 42. Gary Namie & Ruth Namie, THE BULLY AT WORK, 3 (rev. ed. 2003) (alterations in 
original). 
 43. Duncan Chappel & Vittorio Di Martino, VIOLENCE AT WORK 20 (3d ed. 2006) 
(emphasis removed). 
 44. Amanda E. Lueders, You’ll Need More Than A Voltage Converter:  Plugging 
European Workplace Bullying Laws Into The American Jurisprudential Outlet, 25 Ariz. J. 
Int’l & Comp. L. 197, 200 (2008) (quoting David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of 
“Workplace Bullying” and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 
88 GEO. L. J. 475, 481 (2000)). 
 45. See, e.g., Harthill, supra note 36, at 247-48 (“Helen Green was employed as a 
secretary in Deutsche-Bank’s London office.  Although she received positive evaluations, 
promotions, and salary increases, every day at work was terrorizing.  Four of her colleagues, 
including her supervisor, subjected her to a sustained campaign of emotional abuse.  They 
constantly made it difficult for Ms. Green to perform her work by moving her papers, hiding 
her mail, removing her from document circulation lists, and ignoring and excluding her in 
meetings and social functions.  Ms. Green’s supervisor increased her workload to 
unreasonable and arbitrary levels.  In addition, her colleagues burst out laughing when she 
walked past them and made crude and lewd remarks.  Ms. Green complained about the 
behavior to management, but no action was taken.  Ms. Green eventually developed a major 
depressive disorder and at one point was taken to [sic] hospital and put on suicide watch.  
Deutsche-Bank paid for her to undergo stress counseling and assertiveness training but 
never reprimanded or discharged her colleagues or otherwise intervened.”). 
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II. CURING THE BULLY PROBLEM 
I know what you’re thinking.  Did he fire six shots or only five?  
Well to tell you the truth in all this excitement I’ve kind of lost 
track myself.  But being this is a .44 Magnum, the most powerful 
hand gun in the world, and would blow your head clean off, 
you’ve got to ask yourself one question:  “Do I feel lucky?”  
Well, do ya punk?46 — Harry Callahan 
Legislative solutions are generally preferable when compared to 
judicial ones.47  Legislators are typically more familiar with the various 
social policies, constraints, and community mores that impact peoples’ 
lives and our legal system and are, therefore, better able to respond to the 
evolving nature of law than the judiciary.  Chief Justice Burger explained: 
What is more important is that we are without competence to 
entertain these arguments — either to brush them aside as 
fantasies generated by fear of the unknown, or to act on them.  
The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for 
resolution within the legislative process after the kind of 
investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies can 
provide and courts cannot.  That process involves the balancing 
of competing values and interests, which in our democratic 
system is the business of elected representatives.  Whatever their 
validity, the contentions now pressed on us should be addressed 
to the political branches of the Government, the Congress and the 
Executive, and not to the courts.48 
This is not to say that the judiciary has no role in the creation and 
formation of laws.  “Not only do state-court judges possess the power to 
‘make’ common law, but they have the immense power to shape the States’ 
constitutions as well.”49  As Justice Brown of the California Supreme Court 
explained: 
When exercising common law powers, all judges “make law,” for 
the techniques of the common law involve reaching beyond 
positive law for a standard to guide the creation of a new legal 
rule or to supplement an old one.  The real question is not 
whether judges “make law,” it is whether they respect the 
boundaries imposed on their discretion by precedent and statute, 
 
 46. Fred R. Shapiro and Joseph Epstein, THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 261 (2006) 
(quoting Dirty Harry (Warner 1971)). 
 47. Patsy v. Board of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 513 (1992) (stating that, 
“legislative[,] not judicial[,] solutions are preferable”). 
 48. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980). 
 49. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002). 
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and by constitutional text, design and tradition.  It is arrogance, 
carelessness, and a lack of candor that constitute impermissible 
judicial practice, not creativity.50 
Simply put, judges may create “common law.”  But what is the 
common law?  How is the common law to be understood such that a court 
may reasonably exercise its powers without overstepping legislative 
prerogative?  Professor Elisabeth Zoller provides the following framework 
for the judiciary’s right, privilege, and power to make law: 
In the common law tradition, to which the United States remains 
steadfastly faithful, courts are able to rely on a rich legacy of 
rights and liberties dating from time immemorial.  These ancient 
rights and liberties have never been abrogated; on the contrary, 
all of them were accepted by the legislatures in the states, and 
they are still in force when courts decide on their cases.  This 
wealth of rights and liberties is the common law, and this 
common law is the fulcrum that allows the lever of judicial 
review to rise so high.  As in England, in this country the 
common law means that in the legal system there exists a bundle 
of rights and freedoms, coming from the depths of history, which 
are not part of the social contract but rather are reserved, that is, 
protected from legislative encroachments.  And the role of courts 
is to dig into this endless wealth of rights, as needed, and remind 
the legislator of their existence.51 
From these passages we may derive the following principle:  the 
creation of new law generally belongs to lawfully elected legislative 
bodies.  However, this is not a bright line rule.  Not infrequently, the 
legislative bodies do not act, whether due to some infirmity or mere 
neglect.  During these times of inaction, or when fundamental rights are at 
issue, the courts may (or even should), step into the fray, settle the problem, 
and thereby create a pathway for the resolution of similar conflicts. 
Deferring all development of the common law to the legislature 
makes no sense because common law, by definition, is “the body 
of law derived from judicial decisions, rather than from statutes 
or constitutions.”  Common law is “judge-made” rules as 
opposed to statutory rules. . . .  [W]hile statutes may modify our 
common law, the common law can properly be modified by 
judicial decisions . . . .  The fundamental characteristic of the 
common law is its continuously developing jurisprudence.  For 
us to honor and apply an antiquated and outdated principle of 
common law in deference to the legislature is to avoid our clear 
 
 50. Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 993 P.2d 388, 403 (Cal. 2000) (Brown, J., 
concurring). 
 51. Elisabeth Zoller, Public Law as the Law of Res Publica, 32 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNATIONAL L. REV. 93, 101 (2008-2009). 
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responsibility as judges.  We respectfully suggest that the . . . 
observation that “the legislature is best equipped to handle” such 
matters ignores the co-equal duty of the judiciary to consider, 
modify, and thereby redirect the course of our evolving common 
law.52 
When there is no relevant statute, when fundamental rights are at 
issue, and when the courts have no relevant precedent from which 
resolution of the legal problem may be based, courts ought to create an 
appropriate cause of action.  Doing so will allow the problem presented to 
be addressed in a fair and equitable manner and will lay the groundwork for 
resolution of similar problems in our various courts. 
This paper examines two potential legislative and two potential 
judicial options to address the problem of workplace bullying.53 
A. Congress to the Rescue – Well, Maybe! 
Reader, suppose you were an idiot.  And suppose you were a member 
of Congress.  But I repeat myself.54 — Mark Twain 
i. Legislative Option One:  Title VII 
Title VII is a significant force in the fight against workplace 
inequities.55  However, Title VII is not the panacea of protection some may 
have hoped for.56  Title VII prohibits discrimination in the workplace on 
 
 52. Noone v. Chalet of Wichita, L.L.C., 96 P.3D 674, 678-79 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) 
(citations omitted) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 293 (8th ed. 2004) and Ling v. Jan’s 
Liquors, 703 P.2d 731, 739 (Kan. 1985)). 
 53. Of the potential legislative responses, one is based on a highly successful though 
somewhat outdated federal statute.  The other is based on proposed state level legislation.  
While a new federal statute, one that may address the problem globally, is not 
inconceivable, it is unlikely.  See Corbett, supra note 9, at 95 (“The failure to enact federal 
legislative responses to emerging workplace issues does not necessarily signal the demise of 
employment law in the United States.  What it may signal is the end of an era, spanning 
about thirty years, when federal legislation was the legal method of choice to address 
emerging workplace problems.  We have reached a point in the development of American 
employment law at which the regulatory panacea for the latter half of the twentieth century 
has become very difficult to implement.  That situation is likely to be exacerbated in the 
years ahead.  The era of federal employment legislation as the predominant type of 
employment law may be over—at least for a while.”). 
 54. 2 ALBERT BIGELOW PAINE, MARK TWAIN, A BIOGRAPHY 724 (Harper & Brothers 1912). 
 55. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 630 (1987) (describing Title VII’s 
important role of “eliminating the effects of discrimination in the workplace”). 
 56. Ann C. McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities:  Bullying & Harassment 
“Because of Sex”, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1151, 1193 (2008) (“Professor Yamada . . . models 
his bill on current Title VII hostile work environment law and argues that a reason for 
passing the gender-neutral, anti-bullying law is that courts have failed to interpret Title VII 
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account of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”57  By definition, 
the statutory scheme is self-limiting; it protects the identified classes of 
people against discriminatory behavior, but no more. 
Title VII does not, nor was it designed to, protect against 
nondiscriminatory workplace harassment.  Our Supreme Court has 
pointedly explained that Title VII may not be used as a “general civility 
code.”58  While bullying is more than incivility, the Court’s statement 
points to a fundamental problem in attempting to graft a bullying cause of 
action onto the statute – it was not meant to provide such relief; except 
incidentally where the target is a member of a protected class, but again 
only so long as the action is discriminatory.  Thus, it has been noted that 
equal opportunity harassers (i.e., those who are jerks regardless of race, 
sex, etc.) may harass with impunity.59  The court in Lewis v. Ivy Tech State 
College summarized the problem as follows: 
The undisputed facts, when viewed in a light most favorable to 
the Plaintiff, establish that he did not get along with his 
supervisor, Jim Zion, whom he believes to be a tyrant, a bully, 
passive aggressive in his style of management, dishonest, and 
disrespectful-to [sic] everyone he worked with.  However, Title 
VII “does not guarantee a utopian workplace, or even a pleasant 
one.”60 
In short, Title VII protects victims from discriminatory harassment, 
 
to capture harassing behavior that is gender-neutral in cases in which there is both sexual 
and gendered treatment and gender-neutral treatment.” (citation omitted)). 
 57. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (2007) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice . . . 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) 
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way 
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”). 
 58. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). 
 59. Jordan, supra note 29, at 647 (“Surprisingly, the Equal-Opportunity Harasser 
defense, if proven, often results in the bully’s triumph, leaving the plaintiff without a 
method of recovery.  To recover under Title VII, the plaintiff must prove that the alleged 
harassment was motivated by the victim’s gender, race, country of origin, or religion.  A 
plaintiff who complains of general harassment that lacks such motivation has no comparable 
legal protection.” (citations omitted)); see also Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (“[I]nappropriate conduct that is inflicted on both sexes, or is inflicted regardless 
of sex, is outside the statute’s ambit.”). 
 60. 2006 WL 1408398, AT *3 (N.D. Ind. May 18, 2006) (quoting Vore v. Ind. Bell Tel. 
Co., 32 F.3d 1161, 1162 (7th Cir. 1994)); see also Davenport v. Northrop Grumman 
Systems Corp., 281 F. App’x 585, 588 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[C]omplaints about personality 
conflicts do not merit protection under Title VII.”). 
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but “does not address generally offensive or unpleasant conduct.”61  Indeed, 
“Title VII does not provide a cause of action for employees who are 
exposed to harassment that has no reference to race, sex or national 
origin.”62  “[W]hat bothers people about abusive workplace conduct, after 
all, is not the fact that it may be discriminatory but that it is abusive in the 
first place.”63  Unfortunately, Title VII is not the platform upon which relief 
may be built for generally abusive conduct. 
ii. Legislative Option Two:  The Healthy Workplace Bill 
The Healthy Workplace Bill (“Bill”) is a model anti-bullying bill, 
designed in large measure by Professor David C. Yamada.64  “According to 
Yamada, the bill ‘seeks to give severely bullied employees who have 
suffered concrete psychological, physical or economic effects the right to 
sue the bully or the company.’”65  Accordingly, the Bill makes it unlawful 
for an employer to:  (1) subject an employee to an abusive work 
environment (as defined in the Bill)66 or (2) to retaliate against an employee 
because:  (a) the employee has opposed an unlawful employment practice, 
or (b) has filed a charge or participated in an investigation of an unlawful 
employment practice.67 
To its credit, the Bill is the first real legislative option providing 
claimants a right of judicial redress.  However, the Bill is not without its 
 
 61. St. Hilaire v. The Pep Boys—Manny, Moe and Jack, 73 F.Supp.2d 1350, 1364 (S.D. 
Fla. 1999) (citation omitted). 
 62. Id.   See also Potts v. Conecuh-Monroe Counties Gas Dist., 2000 WL 1229838, at 
*20 (S.D. Ala. 2000) (“While Potts has presented evidence that Johnson’s conduct was 
physically threatening and humiliating on three occasions during his approximately four 
years of employment with the defendant, on none of these occasions did Johnson use racial 
slurs or otherwise denigrate plaintiff’s heritage.  This omission is important because it leads 
inexorably to the conclusion that Johnson’s conduct was not race driven, it being contrary to 
common sense that a supervisor guilty of racial harassment would refrain from racial 
epithets during those times when he is physically threatening an employee and roundly 
yelling at and cursing the employee, but rather, was perforce driven by Johnson’s 
unredeemable and self-loathing boorish, bullying, offensive and unpleasant character and 
personality.  Title VII simply cannot be used as a shield to protect against physically 
threatening and humiliating conduct that is not race-based, rather, such protection must 
necessarily come from an enlightened and sensitive employer.” (citation omitted)). 
 63. Jordan, supra note 29, at 647 (quoting Editorial, Justice Scalia and Mr. Oncale, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1998, at C6). 
 64. A copy of the complete Bill is included in Appendix A. 
 65. M. Neil Browne & Mary Allison Smith, Mobbing in the Workplace:  The Latest 
Illustration of Pervasive Individualism in American Law, 12 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 131, 
151-52 (2008) (quoting Laurie Meyers, Still Wearing the “Kick Me” Sign, MONITOR ON 
PSYCHOL., July/Aug. 2006, at 68, available at 
http://www.apa.org/monitor/julaug06/kickme.html). 
 66. Bill, infra App’x A, at § 3. 
 67. Bill, infra App’x A, at § 6. 
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flaws.  As one commentator recently observed, “[o]ther than the general 
requirement that a behavior be persistent and significant for a plaintiff to 
recover, the bill gives little guidance regarding what is and is not 
permissible behavior.”68  Presumably, this reference is to the Bill’s rather 
open-ended definition of bullying, which must be gathered by reference to 
several different sections of the Bill.69 
Simply put, the Bill is overly broad because “anything that bothers an 
employee could be a cause of action. . . . Without clear standards, judges 
will be left to craft the details of the law or forced to submit most claims to 
a jury trial.”70  Of course, if a statute’s standards are overly-broad, the 
statute is, by necessity, void.  “The void-for-vagueness doctrine reflects the 
principle that ‘a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act 
in terms so vague that [persons] of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first 
essential of due process of law.’”71  In other words, the statute must be 
understandable by the average, reasonably intelligent person.  However, 
given the definitional flexibility of the Bill, one is left with serious doubts 
on this matter. 
Equally problematic is the Bill’s alleged statutory damage cap.  While 
the Bill purportedly caps employer damages at $25,000 for committing 
“an” unlawful employment practice, there does not appear to be any limit 
on the number of unlawful employment practices that an employer can 
commit on a per person basis.72  If, for example, Employer A on January 1 
 
 68. Lueders, supra note 44, at 230 (citation omitted). 
 69. See Bill, infra App’x A, at § 7(2) (“Where an employer has been found to have 
committed an unlawful employment practice . . . its liability for damages for emotional 
distress shall not exceed $25,000 . . . .”).  An unlawful employment practice is subjecting an 
employee to “an abusive work environment.”  Id. at § 3. Abusive work environment means 
“abusive conduct so severe that it causes tangible harm to the complainant.”  Id. at § 2(3). 
Abusive conduct is “repeated infliction of . . . derogatory remarks, insults, and epithets; 
verbal or physical conduct . . . or the gratuitous sabotage or undermining of a person’s work 
performance.”  Id. at § 2(3) (c).  While a “single act normally will not constitute abusive 
conduct, [] an especially severe and egregious act may meet this standard.”  Id. 
 70. Lueders, supra note 44, at 230 (citation omitted); see also Corbett, supra note 9, at 
124 (“Among the proposals for new law to address status-neutral workplace harassment, 
those invoking new statutes are misguided.  Harassment and abuse are concepts that are too 
amorphous to be prohibited by statute.  Any statute would say, in effect, ‘Don’t [sic] be 
mean.’  Although the principle is laudatory, this clearly is a misuse of legislation as a 
regulatory mechanism, as it would provide no guidance whatsoever.  Moreover, since it 
would likely be so vague, the statute would not alter the case-by-case adjudication that takes 
place now under the common law protections.  It would thus be ineffective and superfluous.  
By contrast, adjusting common law tort theories would fine-tune the law and harmonize it 
with societal needs on a case-by-case basis, as well as avoid adding unnecessary law to an 
already crowded legislative field.”). 
 71. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629 (1984) (quoting Connally v. General 
Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)) (alteration in original). 
 72. While the Bill defines unlawful employment practice in terms of “an abusive work 
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committed an unlawful employment practice based on two incidents of 
derogatory remarks, then on February 15 committed another unlawful 
employment practice based on two epithets, etc., it is fairly easy to see how 
the number of unlawful employment practices can quickly grow, such that 
if the employer is found to have committed a total of ten (10) unlawful 
employment practices against its employee, then the employer may be 
liable for up to $250,000 in damages, rather than the stated $25,000.  The 
bill’s damage cap is ineffective in two further critical ways:  (1) the cap 
does not apply if the employer has taken a negative employment action73; 
and (2) the statutory cap “does not apply to individually named co-
employee defendants.”74  Considering that the Bill holds the employer 
vicariously liable for the actions of its employees,75 one wonders whether 
the statutory cap imposes any meaningful limitation. 
The damages problem continues to grow as the number of offended 
employees increase, such that if the employer has ten (10) bullied 
employees each with ten (10) actions, the potential damages now rise to 
$2,500,000.  The damages become particularly alarming in the context of a 
class action lawsuit where there may be hundreds of employees represented 
in a single action.  Here, the damages could be in the hundreds of millions 
of dollars.  Overly large statutory damages raise due process concerns.76  If 
the damages become company crippling, courts may refuse to certify the 
class.77 
Finally, there is a concern for strike suits, or suits brought to force 
settlement, regardless of merit, merely because the risk of loss is too 
great.78  Because the costs of litigation can be substantial, defendants are 
under tremendous pressure to settle, “regardless of the cases’ merits.”79  
 
environment,” abusive work environment is further defined in terms of “abusive conduct” 
which is further defined as one or more abusive acts.  Bill, infra App’x A, at §§ 2-4. 
 73. Bill, infra App’x A, at § 7 (“Where an employer has been found to have committed 
an unlawful employment practice under this Chapter that did not culminate in a negative 
employment decision, its liability for damages for emotional distress shall not exceed 
$25,000 . . . .”). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at §4. 
 76. Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 587 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(“Due process may require courts to reduce a statutory-damage award in a class action.”) 
(citing Parker v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 77. Parker v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P., 198 F.R.D. 374, 383 (E.D.N.Y. 
2001) (“[A] class action is not the superior manner of proceeding where the liability 
defendant stands to incur is grossly disproportionate to any actual harm sustained by an 
aggrieved individual.”). 
 78. A strike suit is defined as a “suit (esp. a derivative action), often based on no valid 
claim, brought either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated 
settlement.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (7th ed. 1999). 
 79. Lawrence W. Schonbrun, The Class Action Con Game, 20 REGULATION 50, 52 
(1997). 
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This pressure becomes especially problematic for defendants facing 
potentially ruinous litigation. 
These shortcomings point to a further problem, perhaps an 
insurmountable one, in crafting an appropriate legislative response:  the 
difficulty of drafting legislation that fits the varying characteristics of 
workplace bullying.  The required degree of “analytical flexibility . . . 
cannot be readily built into a statute.”80 
Such flexibility is necessary both because of the variety of factual 
situations, and the lack of consensus on the societal balancing of 
the conflicting interests of employers and employees.  On the 
issue of electronic monitoring in particular, employers’ interests 
are numerous and credible; consequently, it is not clear how and 
under what circumstances U.S. society should prohibit electronic 
monitoring by employers.  Nor is it clear for what types of 
harassing or bullying conduct, and by what persons, society 
should hold employers liable.  Further development of the law is 
needed on a case-by-case basis.81 
 Perhaps the foregoing concerns account for the Bill’s unanimous 
failure to be enacted into law by any state.  Thus far, the Bill has been 
placed “on the legislative agenda in thirteen U.S. states.”82  Although 
introduced on multiple occasions, “no states have passed the Healthy 
Workplace Bill or similar legislation.”83  This is not to say that the Bill 
cannot be corrected and, perhaps, enacted into law.  Currently, however, 
there does not appear to be the legislative will necessary to bring this Bill 
to fruition. 
C. The Judicial Cure 
Success is a little like wrestling a gorilla.  You don’t quit when you’re 
tired—you quit when the gorilla is tired.84 —Robert Strauss 
Access to courts for the resolution of civil wrongs is a fundamental 
right to be freely exercised by all people.85  “Access to the courts is 
 
 80. Corbett, supra note 9, at 95. 
 81. Id. at 95-96. 
 82. Harthill, supra note 36, at 250. 
 83. Lueders, supra note 44, at 198. 
 84. BOB KELLY, WORTH REPEATING 325 (2003) (quoting Robert Strauss).  But see 
Counce v. Nicholson, 2007 WL 1191013, at *19 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 18, 2007) (“A reasonable 
juror could infer that the disagreement between Counce and her supervisors regarding the 
handling of perceived bullying in the workplace caused Counce’s termination.  Thus, the 
Court concludes that Counce has met the requirements of a prima facie case of retaliation 
under Title VII.”). 
 85. Holland v. Lutz, 401 P.2d 1015, 1023 (Kan. 1965) (“The general rule followed by 
this and other courts appeals to us as a salutary one.  The right of private citizens to resort 
freely to their courts for redress of wrongs is fundamental to our system of society, and its 
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particularly important for . . . disenfranchised groups who must rely on the 
legal system for protection of basic human and civil rights.”86  There may 
be no group more fully disenfranchised than the bully’s targets who are 
“profoundly ashamed of being victimized and are confused at their 
apparent inability to fight back and protect themselves.”87 
For this reason, courts must remain open to all who seek their help and 
ever ready to craft judicial resolutions to the problems presented.  It is an 
important and “proper function of tort law to assign responsibility and 
create appropriate incentives for safety when there is protracted legislative 
inaction in response to a continuing serious personal injury toll.”88  While 
the bullied have repeatedly sought legislative aid, no relief has been 
provided.  The situation is grave.  Without court action, the toll in terms of 
human and organizational carnage will only grow as the bullies continue to 
be rewarded for their reprehensible behavior.89 
Courts would do well to keep in mind the admonition of Justice Story: 
[C]ourts of equity constantly decline to lay down any rule which 
shall limit their power and discretion as to the particular cases. . . 
.  And there is wisdom in this course, for it is impossible to 
foresee all the exigencies of society which may require their aid 
and assistance to protect rights and redress wrongs.  The 
jurisdiction of these courts, thus operating by way of special 
injunction, is manifestly indispensable for the purpose of social 
justice in a great variety of cases, and therefore should be upheld 
by a steady confidence.90 
 
exercise is to be encouraged, not hampered.”); Bollinger v. Texas Co., 95 So. 2d 132, 137 
(La. 1957) (“It is fundamental that the function of a court is to redress wrongs and where 
there has been no injury there is no cause for judicial action.”); State v. Superior Court, 159 
P. 92, 97 (Wash. 1916) (“It is impossible to foresee all the exigencies of society which may 
require the aid and assistance of courts of equity to protect rights or redress wrongs.  The 
jurisdiction of such courts is manifestly indispensable in a great variety of cases for the 
purposes of social justice, and therefore should be fostered and upheld by a steady 
confidence.”) (citing 1 JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 263 (13th ed. 1886)). 
 86. Suzette M. Malveaux, Statutes of Limitations:  A Policy Analysis in the Context of 
Reparations Litigation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 84 (2005).  
 87. Lutgen-Sandvik et al., supra note 8, at 837. 
 88. Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 436 (1999). 
 89. Browne & Smith, supra note 65, at 142 n.58 (“[C]ertain workplace environments 
can be conducive to bullying.  These include businesses that have ‘an obsession with 
outcomes’ and focus on ‘short-term planning’ to meet the expectations of management and 
investors.  Such a climate may reward bullies for unduly pressuring their co-workers to 
work harder and faster, or meet deadlines.  In these environments, employees are guided by 
fear for their jobs.”) (citation omitted); Jordan, supra note 29, at 658 (“All too often, 
supervisors who manage with bully power are considered effective and are therefore 
rewarded for what is perceived to be assertive, direct management.”). 
 90. Kellogg v. King, 114 P. 378, 386-87 (Cal. 1896) (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE §§ 856 b., 863, 929, 948 (13th ed. 1886)). 
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i. Common Law Option One:  Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) (also known as 
the tort of outrage) is, as the name suggests, one of several intentional torts.  
While the elements necessary to establish a claim for IIED vary somewhat 
from state to state, generally the plaintiff must show:  “(1) The conduct 
must be intentional or reckless; (2) The conduct must be extreme and 
outrageous; (3) There must be a causal connection between the wrongful 
conduct and the emotional distress; (4) The emotional distress must be 
severe.”91 
At first blush, IIED appears to be the appropriate tort from which to 
craft relief for those suffering from bullying in the workplace.  First, IIED 
is recognized by nearly every state.92  Second, IIED provides relief for 
claims of mental distress, as that is the tort’s purpose.  Furthermore, the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts neatly anticipates the application of IIED to 
the peculiar problems employees face in the workplace.93  Finally, the tort 
has recently received a measure of favor in the context of workplace 
bullying: 
In determining whether the defendant assaulted the plaintiff or 
committed intentional infliction of emotional distress, the 
behavior of the defendant was very much an issue.  The phrase 
“workplace bullying,” like other general terms used to 
characterize a person’s behavior, is an entirely appropriate 
consideration in determining the issues before the jury.  As 
evidenced by the trial court’s questions to counsel during pre-trial 
proceedings, workplace bullying could “be considered a form of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.”94 
Unfortunately, the acclaim has not been universal.  While IIED’s first 
 
 91. Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (Md. 1977) (citing Womack v. Eldridge, 210 
S.E.2d (Va. 1974)). 
 92. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621-22 nn.2-3 (Tex. 1993) (identifying 
forty-seven states that recognize IIED (forty-four of which adopted the tort as set out in § 
46(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts)).  As stated in § 46(1), “One who by extreme 
and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to 
another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other 
results from it, for such bodily harm.” 
 93. Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 335 S.E.2d 445, 448 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) 
(“Moreover, the existence of a special relationship in which one person has control over 
another, as in the employer-employee relationship, may produce a character of 
outrageousness that otherwise might not exist.”) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
46(1), cmt. e)). 
 94. Raess v. Doescher, 883 N.E.2d 790, 799 (Ind. 2008) (noting that while the trial 
court rejected the plaintiff’s IIED claim, workplace bullying evidence was, nonetheless, 
relevant to the claim). 
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and third elements present a fairly low bar for plaintiffs to cross,95 bullied 
plaintiffs have run into substantial difficulty with the tort’s second 
requirement of extreme and outrageous conduct.96  As Professor Yamada 
recently explained: 
[T]he degree of severity of conduct and harm to the plaintiff 
required under hostile work environment and discrimination 
analyses is notably lower than that required under IIED.  In 
effect, the courts have said that conduct that is actionable under 
an employment discrimination theory often does not rise to the 
level of IIED.  At least those plaintiffs who can prove status-
based harassment or discrimination still have avenues of legal 
relief via employment discrimination statutes.  However, for 
plaintiffs who are not members of a protected class, or for those 
who are members of a protected class but cannot establish a 
legally sufficient link between the complained-of behavior and 
their protected status, IIED may be the only possible cause of 
action.  Unfortunately for them, the thresholds for establishing 
extreme or outrageous conduct and severe emotional distress are 
simply too high for IIED to serve as a useful weapon against 
workplace bullying.97 
 The New York Court of Appeals further confirmed this concern, 
noting that “of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims 
considered by this Court, every one has failed because the alleged conduct 
 
 95. As to the first element, a mere showing of recklessness is all that is required.  That 
is, the plaintiff does not have show that the defendant set out to purposely harm the plaintiff.  
As the Supreme Court of Tennessee explained, “reckless misconduct generally has not been 
perceived as conduct which must be directed toward specific, pre-identified victims.”  Doe 1 
ex rel. Doe 1 v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Nashville, 154 S.W.3d 22, 37 (Tenn. 2005).  
That is, “recklessness cannot require that the actor aim the conduct toward a specific person 
or a specific result, for to do so would contradict the inattentive and thoughtless nature of 
disregard.”  Id.  The third element requires nothing more than a showing of causality. 
 96. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1); see also Perez v. Nike, Inc., 2008 WL 
282271, at *2 (D.Or. Jan. 30, 2008) (“Here, plaintiff alleges that defendant occasionally 
denied him the services of an interpreter, insulted another Hispanic employee in his 
presence, subjected plaintiff to “verbal abuse” and/or disciplinary measures when he 
requested family leave and accommodations for his back injury, treated plaintiff differently 
from similarly-situated employees, and failed to remedy harassing conduct after plaintiff 
complained about it.  Even if plaintiff’s allegations are true, defendant’s actions do not rise 
to the level of conduct that ‘extraordinarily’ transcends the boundaries of socially acceptable 
behavior under Oregon law.”).  But see Wheeler v. Marathon Printing, Inc., 974 P.2d 207, 
215 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (“[T]here was ample evidence for the jury to conclude that 
Wilkinson was a sadistic bully who enjoyed preying on plaintiff’s fragile mental state, and 
who, despite plaintiff’s pleas to stop, did everything he could to torment plaintiff, even after 
plaintiff’s suicide attempt.  The totality of Wilkinson’s conduct, by any measure, was 
extraordinarily vicious and intolerable.”). 
 97. Yamada, supra note 22, at 503. 
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was not sufficiently outrageous.”98  This is true, in part, because “even 
harsh and unnecessary discipline or pervasive yelling in the workplace does 
not constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress.”99 
Even where courts have been more receptive to IIED claims based on 
workplace abuse, it is not uncommon for those courts to require a second 
supporting tort, creating the impression that workplace abuse is somehow 
less worthy of judicial relief.  So, for example, some Florida “courts . . . 
have allowed claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the 
workplace to go forward, where the claims involve persistent verbal abuse 
coupled with repeated offensive physical contact.”100  Short of “offensive 
 
 98. Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 702 (N.Y. 1993); see also Prunty v. 
Arkansas Freightways, Inc., 16 F.3d 649, 654 (5th Cir. 1994) (“In other words, even though 
conduct may violate Title VII as sexual harassment, it does not necessarily become 
intentional infliction of emotional distress under Texas law.  Only in the most unusual cases 
does the conduct move out of the ‘realm of an ordinary employment dispute’ . . . .”); Roscoe 
v. Hastings, 43,942, p.5 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09); 999 So. 2d 1218, 1221  (“Although 
recognizing a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in a workplace 
setting, this state’s jurisprudence has limited the cause of action to cases which involve a 
pattern of deliberate, repeated harassment over a period of time. . . .  Moreover, the conduct 
must be intended and calculated to cause severe emotional distress, not just some lesser 
degree of fright, humiliation, embarrassment or worry.”) (citation omitted); Lee v. Golden 
Triangle Planning & Dev. Dist., Inc., 797 So. 2d 845, 845 (Miss. 2001) (holding that there 
was no intentional infliction of emotional distress under Mississippi law); Magidson v. 
Wachovia Bank, NA, 2007 WL 4592230, *4 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 27, 2007) (“North Carolina 
courts have been reluctant to extend intentional infliction of emotional distress liability in 
the workplace.”). 
 99. Ward v. Conn. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 2009 WL 179786, *15 (D. Conn. Jan. 21, 
2009) (citations omitted); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) cmt. d (“The cases 
thus far decided have found liability only where the defendant’s conduct has been extreme 
and outrageous.  It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is 
tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that 
his conduct has been characterized by ‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which would 
entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.  Liability has been found only 
where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go 
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly 
intolerable in a civilized community.  Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of 
the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the 
actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”). 
 100. De La Campa v. Grifols America, Inc., 819 So. 2d 940, 944 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2002); see also GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 613-14 (Tex. 1999) 
(holding that emotional distress suffered by employees was severe).  In the GTE case, 
employees faced a strange barrage of emotional and physical abuse.  While GTE claimed 
the “evidence establishes nothing more than an ordinary employment dispute” the court 
strongly disagreed observing that the evidence demonstrated: 
Shields [GTE Supervisor] engaged in a pattern of grossly abusive, threatening, 
and degrading conduct. . . .  Several witnesses testified that Shields used the 
word “f---” as part of his normal pattern of conversation, and that he regularly 
heaped abusive profanity on the employees. . . .  On one occasion when Bruce 
asked Shields to curb his language because it was offensive, Shields positioned 
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physical contact,” plaintiffs are often left without recourse.  Even with such 
conduct it is not unusual for plaintiffs to lose.101 
The De La Campa court neatly summarized the nearly insurmountable 
hurdle between workplace abuse problems and IIED claims: 
Texeira and Garcia, subjected De La Campa to a severe and 
pervasive pattern of sexual harassment, including but not limited 
to, derogatory comments relating to homosexuality and other 
unwelcome abusive acts and conduct directed at her because of 
her sexual orientation and because she asserted her right to work 
free from discrimination. . . . Additionally, . . . De La Campa was 
intentionally excluded from corporate-sponsored social functions 
because of her sexual orientation. 
 
 
himself in front of her face, and screamed, “I will do and say any damn thing I 
want.  And I don’t give a s--- who likes it.” . . . There was further evidence that 
Shields’s harsh and vulgar language was not merely accidental, but seemed 
intended to abuse the employees. 
More importantly, the employees testified that Shields repeatedly physically and 
verbally threatened and terrorized them.  There was evidence that Shields was 
continuously in a rage, and that Shields would frequently assault each of the 
employees by physically charging at them.  When doing so, Shields would bend 
his head down, put his arms straight down by his sides, ball his hands into fists, 
and walk quickly toward or “lunge” at the employees, stopping uncomfortably 
close to their faces while screaming and yelling. . . .  Bruce stated that such 
conduct was not a part of any disciplinary action against her.  Further, the 
incidents usually occurred in the open rather than in private.  Bruce testified 
that, on one occasion, Shields began beating a banana on his desk, and when he 
jumped up and slammed the banana into the trash, Bruce thought he would hit 
her.  Afterwards, Shields was shaking and said “I’m sick.” 
 101. Preston v. Chancellor’s Learning Sys., 2009 WL 1583464, at *7 (S.D. Ind. June 04, 
2009) (“Preston alleges that Williams regularly commented on Preston’s bodily features, 
and her voice and walk. Compl. ¶ 18. He stated how ‘hot’ Preston looked, and what a ‘nice 
ass’ she had.  Id.  Williams smacked and touched Preston’s buttocks, and picked her up, 
threw her over his shoulder, and carried her around the office.  Id.  Williams ‘corner[ed]’ 
Preston in such a fashion that she could not move and then leaned into her personal space.  
Id.  Williams called and texted her after work hours and requested that she meet him, pick 
him up, or ‘do a little dance for him.’  Id.  Williams previously told Preston that he wanted 
to ‘have an affair with her’ and that they should ‘run off to Vegas [to] get married.’  Id.  
Williams also discussed several sexual scenarios in detail and placed Preston into those 
scenarios.  Id.  Moreover, Williams continued this behavior even after Preston told Williams 
‘no’ and instructed him to stop his harassment.  Id. ¶ 19.  When Preston confronted 
management, Williams not only failed to stop his harassment, he retaliated against Preston 
by changing Preston’s work schedule to hours that Williams’ knew Preston was unavailable.  
Id. ¶ 25.  He also distributed Preston’s sales leads to other sales representatives and caused 
her numbers and pay to suffer.  Id.  The Court concludes that, taking the allegations in the 
Complaint as true, under Indiana law ‘[r]easonable persons may differ on the questions of 
whether [Williams’] conduct was extreme and outrageous…’” (quoting Bradley v. Hall, 720 
N.E.2d 747, 753 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)). 
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These allegations of verbal abuse and disparate treatment, if true, 
constitute objectionable and offensive conduct, but do not rise to 
the level of outrageousness that is required by law in a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress in the employment 
context.102 
ii. Common Law Option Two:  Intentional Infliction of Workplace 
Abuse 
The right to fair treatment at work is fundamental to any system of 
ordered liberty.  As a people, we recoil at the thought of arbitrary 
standards, systems rigged for failure, workplaces that provide no 
opportunity for individual growth because they have been designed for 
denigration rather than elevation: 
The right which is violated by an employer . . . is not the 
employee’s right to the job, but the employee’s right to equal, 
fair, and impartial treatment, the violation of which frequently 
results, inter alia, in a significant injury to the victim’s dignity 
and a demoralizing impairment of his or her self-esteem.103 
The right to be treated in an “equal, fair, and impartial” manner is a 
core human right.  It is fundamental to all of life, including one’s work life: 
Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect from his 
fellow human beings and is in turn bound to respect every other. . 
. .  Hence there rests on [the employer] a duty regarding the 
respect that must be shown to every [employee].104 
A legislative solution to these thorny issues appears unlikely.  
 
 102. De La Campa, 819 So. 2d at 944; see also Earl v. H.D. Smith Wholesale Drug Co., 
2009 WL 1871929, at *4 (C.D. Ill. June 23, 2009) (“Courts recognize a workplace claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress only in the most extreme circumstances, such as 
the berating of a female employee for missing work while hospitalized for premature labor, 
sexually harassing an employee to the point of threatening to rape and kill her, and 
intimidating an employee into falsifying work reports in violation of the law.”), Dozier v. 
Aaron Sales & Lease Ownership for Less, 2009 WL 1066134, at *4 (N.D. Okla. April 20, 
2009) (“In the employment context, courts have considered a range of conduct claimed by a 
plaintiff to be sufficient to merit a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  The courts have consistently applied a very high threshold before recognizing a 
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Oklahoma law 
concerning employment claims.”), Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Guerra, 2009 WL 1900411, at 
*9 (Tex. App. July 01, 2009) (“Texas has adopted a strict approach to intentional infliction 
of emotional distress claims arising in the workplace. . . .  Texas courts decline to recognize 
intentional infliction of distress claims for ordinary employment disputes, recognizing that 
extreme conduct in this context exists only in the most unusual circumstances.”). 
 103. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1232-33 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 104. Immanuel Kant, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 173 (Lara Denis 
ed., Broadview Press 2005) (1785). 
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Furthermore, current tort law offers, at best, limited hope.  However, a 
solution based on the modification of IIED principles (which, in turn, was 
based on the modification of common law contract principles),105 offers 
substantial hope, especially given the various state courts’ willingness over 
the past twenty to thirty years to create new employment law.106  While a 
legislative solution may be preferable, it is not required and sometimes not 
desirable.107 
Wholly new torts, as a matter of experience, are rarely adopted.108  
However, courts have often accepted the modification of existing tort 
law.109  “Rejecting the contention that the legislature should have the first 
 
 105. Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort:  Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
1539, 1548 (1997) (“Contract and property rationales help the new-tort reform effort 
immensely, and successful innovators take pains to find them.  All four of the new-tort 
successes owe debts to contract or property rationales.  Prosser was lucky to have an 
obvious contract antecedent for strict products liability, and he made more luck for himself 
by identifying a contract theme for the new tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.”). 
 106. Thomas C. Kohler, The Employment Relation and its Ordering at Century’s End:  
Reflections on Emerging Trends in the United States, 41 B.C. L. REV. 103, 114 (1999) (“If 
the legislative developments of the past decade can be characterized as efforts to open 
access to market work and ensure continued participation in it, then that theme even more 
strongly stamps many of the leading employment law cases issued by the United States 
Supreme Court during this period.”). 
 107. For additional clarification see Bernstein, supra note 105, at 1564-65.  As one 
attorney noted as part of his strategy to apply common law rather than statutory principles in 
seeking recompense for a client who experienced sexual harassment at work: 
Where jurors might be hostile to all of this “equality” business (and I’ve found 
that many of them are), they fully understand and identify with being trapped in 
a physically and mentally abusive workplace—being a paycheck hostage.  
Tradition, analogy, venerable themes, existing doctrines, adaptation to 
circumstances, and common sense:  surely Prosser, from whatever vantage point 
he now observes tort law, nods his blessing.  The measured, respectful 
movement of a new tort will always appear feeble to activists, threatening to its 
opposition, and of no moment to nearly everyone else; the few of us who look at 
new torts with admiration will have much to appreciate in the coming years, as 
past activism settles into entrenched rights and remedies. 
 108. J. Brian Slaughter, Spoliation of Evidence:  A New Rule of Evidence is the Better 
Solution, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 449, 465 (1994) (“The speculativeness of new tort actions 
and their difficult application militate against them as solutions.”); Corbett, supra note 9, at 
152 n.351 (“Why face the substantial likelihood that a new tort will fail when there are 
existing torts that can be modified to do the job?”); Hector L. MacQueen, Searching for 
Privacy in a Mixed Jurisdiction, 21 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 73, 82 (2006) (“[T]he judicial 
creation of a new tort of invading privacy seems impossible; the protection of privacy 
outside the realm of personal information will have to find a vehicle within other existing 
torts. . . .”). 
 109. Corbett, supra note 9, at 152 n.351; Paul A. LeBel, Beginning the End Game:  The 
Search for an Injury Compensation System Alternative to Tort Liability for Tobacco-Related 
Harms, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 457, 485 (1997) (“One of the most widely adopted 
modifications in tort doctrine in recent years has been the shift in the treatment of plaintiffs’ 
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opportunity to create the tort, the court noted its new cause of action was 
more closely related to the tort of ‘improper interference with existing 
business relationships than with any single substantive topic with which the 
legislature might deal.’”110  As further explained by Justice Sutherland: 
It is said that the common law is susceptible of growth and 
adaptation to new circumstances and situations, and that the 
courts have power to declare and effectuate what is the present 
rule in respect of a given subject without regard to the old rule; 
and some attempt is made to apply that principle here.  The 
common law is not immutable, but flexible, and upon its own 
principles adapts itself to varying conditions.111 
 So then, as the common law is flexible and able to adapt to changing 
circumstances, the question becomes whether it should be adapted to the 
problem of bullying in the workplace and, if it should be adapted, what 
form will the modified tort take? 
As noted earlier, IIED, apart from the requirement of extreme and 
outrageous conduct, offers considerable help for a realistic solution of the 
bully problem.  Not only is IIED an established tort, recognized in nearly 
every state, but it is also able to address both physical and emotional harm 
and has begun to receive some attention related to claims of workplace 
harassment.  Unfortunately, as applied to workplace abuse, the attention 
has been largely negative due, as noted, to the requirement of extreme and 
 
conduct defenses from total bars to recovery to bases for comparative reductions in the 
amount of recovery.”); Bernstein, supra note 105, at 1548; Andrew Boxberger, The Missing 
Link in the Evolution of Law:  Michigan’s Failure to Reflect Society’s Value of Companion 
Animals, 5 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 139, 154 (2002) (“The legislature has the 
power to create and adopt new torts.  However, new torts are usually judicially created.  The 
courts of Michigan have the ability to adopt and modify new torts.”). 
 110. Napreljac v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, 461 F.Supp.2d 981, 1031 n.33 (S.D. Iowa 
2006) (quoting Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co. , 429 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Iowa 1988)). 
 111. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 487 (1934); see also Funk v. United States, 290 
U.S. 371, 381-82 (1933) (“It may be said that the court should continue to enforce the old 
rule, however contrary to modern experience and thought, and however opposed, in 
principle, to the general current of legislation and of judicial opinion it may have become, 
leaving to Congress the responsibility of changing it. Of course, Congress has that power; 
but, if Congress fail to act, as it has failed in respect of the matter now under review, and the 
court be called upon to decide the question, is it not the duty of the court, if it possess the 
power, to decide it in accordance with present-day standards of wisdom and justice rather 
than in accordance with some outworn and antiquated rule of the past?”); Hurtado v. 
California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884) (“It is more consonant to the true philosophy of our 
historical legal institutions to say that the spirit of personal liberty and individual right, 
which they embodied, was preserved and developed by a progressive growth and wise 
adaptation to new circumstances and situations of the forms and processes found fit to give, 
from time to time, new expression and greater effect to modern ideas of self-government.  
This flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation is the peculiar boast and excellence 
of the common law.”). 
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outrageous conduct. 
On the other hand, the courts can and should alter the IIED since 
“[t]he power of courts to modify this tort springs from the nature of the 
common law itself.  Judges make and administer the legal standards 
governing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress; they can 
and should change these standards when they appear to work unjustly.”112  
Here, the standards work a clear injustice:  victims suffer workplace abuse 
by bully bosses yet are without remedy for the harms suffered. 
Where a person suffers actual emotional harm, the courts have an 
obligation to ensure that fair compensation is available.  To do anything 
less would result in the loss of a basic constitutional right: 
The right to recover actual or compensatory damages is property . 
. . . The plaintiff is entitled to recover compensation for mental 
and physical pain and injury to reputation.  These are actual 
damages, and these are property.  “The right to recover damages 
for an injury is a species of property, and vests in the injured 
party immediately on the commission of the wrong.  It is not the 
subsequent verdict and judgment, but the commission of the 
wrong, that gives the right.  The verdict and judgment simply 
define its extent.  Being property, it is protected by the ordinary 
constitutional guaranties.”113 
 Denying compensation for the pain inflicted by workplace bullying is 
tantamount to taking one’s property (damages for the injury) without just 
compensation.  Such an action offends constitutional sensibilities.114 
It has been suggested that IIED is sufficiently broad to respond to the 
type of harm presented by workplace bullying.  The necessary dividing line 
 
 112. Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated “Outrageous” Conduct:  Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against “Other People’s Faiths”, 34 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 579, 582-83 (1993). 
 113. Osborn v. Leach, 47 S.E. 811, 813 (N.C. 1904) (quoting WILLIAM B. HALE, 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 2 n.5 (2d ed. 1912); THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE 
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 445 (5th ed. 1883)); see also Werner v. Se. Cal. 
Assoc. Newspapers, 216 P.2d 825, 840(Cal. 1950) (“When a cause of action arises it has a 
legal value as a chose action—it is a species of property.  Even where there is no legal 
measure of damages, as in case of slander or assault, the injured party has an indeterminate 
right to compensation the instant he receives the injury.  The verdict of the jury and the 
judgment of the court thereon do not give, they only define, the right.  Such right, when 
vested, is to the injured party, of the nature of property, and is protected, as property in 
tangible things, is protected.  It cannot be annulled or changed by legislation, nor 
extinguished except by satisfaction, release or the operation of statutes of limitation.”).  
 114. U.S. W. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of South Dakota, 505 N.W.2d 115, 
126 (S.D. 1993) (“The taking of private property without just compensation is merely 
confiscation, and offends the constitution.”); God’s Ctr. Found. v. Lexington Fayette Urban 
County, 125 S.W.3d 295, 299 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002) (“The taking of private property . . . may 
also offend due process and the prohibition on the arbitrary exercise of power [under state 
law].”). 
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being the status of the defendant: 
For an ordinary defendant[,] the distress induced had to be 
severe, beyond “mere insult, indignity, annoyance, or even 
threats . . . lacking in other circumstances of aggravation.” 
 [However,] for agents . . . who are deemed to have “special 
obligations to the public,” language which is “merely profane, or 
indecent, or grossly insulting to people of ordinary sensibility” is 
enough to give rise to liability.115 
Whether bully bosses may be classified as having “special 
obligations” is beyond the scope of this paper.  However, an argument 
reaching that conclusion is not difficult to imagine.  As employers 
substantially control the workplace, including the hours worked, the tools 
of employment, and the work environment, employers may be held to have 
a special obligation to its employees.  If so, the current elements of the tort 
may suffice.  However, as most courts appear to presume the necessity of 
severe and outrageous behavior, the tort will be more effective if modified 
to address the circumstances of workplace bullying. 
In its modified form, the revised tort may be known as Intentional 
Infliction of Workplace Abuse (“IIWA”).  As noted above, several working 
definitions of workplace bullying have been proffered, most of which share 
the basic framework of negative conduct that causes harm over a period of 
time.116  In order to categorize bullying behavior into a workable legal 
template, this paper merges WBI’s proposed statutory definition with 
Professors Lutgen-Sandvik, Tracy, and Alberts’117 clinical definition in 
order to clearly define the elements of IIWA. 
 
 
 
 
 115. Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination:  Toward a Pluralistic Understanding 
of Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1, 23 (1999) (citation and quotation omitted). 
 116. See, e.g., Suzy Fox & Lamont E. Stallworth, Employee Perceptions of Internal 
Conflict Management Programs and ADR Processes for Preventing and Resolving Incidents 
of Workplace Bullying:  Ethical Challenges for Decision-Makers in Organizations, 8 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 375, 376 (2004) (“Workplace bullying can be defined as ‘persistent 
negative interpersonal behavior experienced by people at work.’”) (citation and quotation 
omitted); Tracy et al., supra note 19, at 152 (“Adult bullying at work involves situations in 
which employees are subjected to repeated, persistent negative acts that are intimidating, 
malicious, and stigmatizing.”); Harthill, supra note 36, at 249 (“Scholars have defined 
workplace bullying in different ways, but it can broadly be defined as:  ‘repeated offensive 
behavior through vindictive, cruel, malicious or humiliating attempts to undermine an 
individual or group of employees.’”) (quoting, Duncan Chappell & Vittorio Di. Martino, 
Violence at Work 20 (3d ed. 2006)). 
 117. Lutgen-Sandvik et al., supra note 8, at 841 (2007) (A person has been bullied 
“when an individual experiences at least two negative acts, weekly or more often, for six or 
more months in situations were targets find it difficult to defend against and stop abuse.”). 
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Defining Bully Behavior 
 
1) Bullying requires exposure by the target to two or more 
negative acts on a weekly basis for at least six months; 
2) Such acts must result in mental or physical harm; 
3) And must occur in situations where targets find it difficult to 
defend against or otherwise stop the abuse. 
 
The first requirement defines an employer’s potential exposure and 
allows the employer time in which to correct the offending behavior.  
Accordingly, if “someone experiences one hostile interaction—regardless 
of how disturbing—this does not equate to bullying.”118  This point 
presupposes, of course, that the employer provides its employees with the 
means to confidentially report the bullying behavior without fear of 
retaliation.  If not, self-help may be useless, barring any other legal 
protections for targets.119 
The second requirement satisfies the legal requirement of actual harm 
before recovery.120  Of course, whenever mental or emotional harm is at 
issue there is always a concern for abuse.  “The nature of pain and suffering 
is such that there is no legal yardstick by which to measure accurately 
reasonable compensation for it . . . .”121  Nevertheless, “compensation for 
such injuries must not be denied simply because it is not easily 
quantified.”122  The goal, regardless of the type of harm, is the same; 
“emotional damages, like other forms of compensatory damages, are 
designed to make the plaintiff whole, and therefore bear a significant and 
altogether determinable relationship to events in which the defendant entity 
participated and could have foreseen.”123  To establish whether the evidence 
is sufficient to warrant “an award of more than nominal damages for 
emotional distress, we examine factors such as the need for medical, 
psychological, or psychiatric treatment, the presence of physical symptoms, 
loss of income, and impact on the plaintiff’s conduct and lifestyle.”124 
 
 118. Tracy et al., supra note 19, at 152 (noting the enduring nature of workplace 
bullying, “lasting over an extended period of time.”). 
 119. Yamada, supra note 22, at 522 (“Legal protections for targets who choose to 
confront their tormentors would, at the very least, satisfy the policy goal of self-help and 
could help to shape a workplace culture that discourages bullying.  The problem is that the 
employer-bully can fire the employee-target who confronts him.  Unfortunately, even if we 
assume that confronting the bully would be construed legally as a form of speech, the law 
offers few protections to targets who engage in this brand of self-help.”). 
 120. Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 615 (2004) (“[T]ort recovery requires both wrongful act 
plus causation and proof of some harm for which damages can reasonably be assessed.”). 
 121. McDonald v. United States, 555 F. Supp. 935, 971 (M.D. Pa. 1983). 
 122. Busche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509, 519 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 123. Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, 505 F.3d 1173, 1199-1200 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 124. Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 180 (4th Cir. 2002) (using the factors in the context of 
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The third requirement presupposes that the target, to the extent 
possible, has taken action to mitigate his or her damages and either has 
been successful (in which case there is no cause of action), or has failed 
either because the organization has no helping mechanism or because the 
harm has otherwise already rendered the target incapable of mitigation. 
Building on the foregoing definition, the transformation of IIED into 
IIWA, may be stated thus: 
 
Intentional Infliction of Workplace Abuse 
 
1) The conduct must be intentional or reckless; 
2) The conduct must result in actual bullying (as defined above); 
3) There must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct 
and the emotional and/or physical harm; 
4) The conduct must occur in the workplace. 
 
So, will the courts adopt this modified tort?  There is no doubt that 
they are empowered to create new tort law or adopt the modification of an 
existing tort.  This power stems from the flexibility given to courts as part 
of the growing common law tradition.  Similarly, there is a significant need 
for the modified tort.  As noted throughout this paper, bullying in the 
workplace is a serious problem and current tort law provides little or no 
relief.  However, successful implementation will require substantial work 
on the part of the bar to challenge the bench, to demonstrate the need for 
the modified tort, and, accordingly, to urge its acceptance.  The process 
will likely be slow, but there is great hope for acceptance.  As a matter of 
practical understanding, tort law exists to punish unacceptable behavior 
and, by extension, encourage acceptable behavior.125  “Bullying causes 
destructive patterns of workplace interactions that create a poisoned work 
environment for all employees.  The social and economic costs of 
workplace bullying are long-term and far reaching.”126  For these reasons, 
legal protections must be developed to protect “against workplace 
harassment [and] serve the interests of the government, employers, and 
employees.”127   
 
statutory interpretation). 
 125. Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 
115, 165 (1993) (“[T]he model of human behavior that underlies tort deterrence theory 
suggests the need for a modification of the tort system to increase the likelihood that 
undesirable behavior is perceived to be punished, and to increase the likelihood that 
desirable behavior is perceived not to be punished.”). 
 126. Gouveia, supra note 6, at 143 (2007). 
 127. Id. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have examined the nature and extent of the bully 
problem, and have considered, in some detail, both legislative and judicial 
relief.  After considering the strengths and weaknesses of both systems, we 
have proposed a new cause of action to enable the bullied to seek direct 
relief through the courts.  Given the lack of support received by the various 
state legislative bodies, tort relief appears to be the better approach.  While 
courts are not inclined to quickly adopt new causes of action, that does not 
mean that courts are unwilling to act.  Indeed, by its nature, common law is 
malleable, able to address evolving claims in light of changing 
circumstances.  As Justice Sutherland observed nearly a century ago:  
“[T]he common law is not immutable but flexible, and by its own 
principles adapts itself to varying conditions.”128 
This flexibility comes with a price—diligence, motivated by reason, to 
persevere, to, in the words of Winston Churchill, “never give in, never give 
in, never, never, never, never—in nothing, great or small, large or petty—
never give in except to convictions of honour and good sense.”129  So, 
here’s to the courts, to their drive to apply the law fairly, and to the hope 
that judicial resolve will recognize the need to vary existing principles of 
tort law in order to provide hope for the abused, for the underdog, for those 
with no place to turn, except to our great judicial body, to provide relief 
from the appalling treatment by the few against the many.  We must never 
forget, “tyranny by the majority is as onerous as tyranny by a select 
minority.”130 
 
 128. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933). 
 129. Winston Churchill, Never Give In, Never, Never, Never, October 29, 1941, 
available at http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/quotations/famous-quotations-
and-stories. 
 130. Banks v. Muncie Cmty. Sch., 433 F.2d 292, 297 (7th Cir. 1970). 
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APPENDIX A 
 
THE HEALTHY WORKPLACE BILL131 
 
SECTION I—FINDINGS AND PURPOSES 
 
A. LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS 
The Legislature finds that: 
1. the social and economic well-being of the State is dependent upon 
healthy and productive employees; 
2. surveys and studies have documented between 16 and 21 percent of 
employees directly experience health-endangering workplace bullying, 
abuse, and harassment, and that this behavior is four times more prevalent 
than sexual harassment alone; 
3. surveys and studies have documented that abusive work 
environments can have serious and even devastating effects on targeted 
employees, including feelings of shame and humiliation, stress, loss of 
sleep, severe anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, suicidal 
tendencies, reduced immunity to infection, stress-related gastrointestinal 
disorders, hypertension, and pathophysiologic changes that increase the 
risk of cardiovascular disease. 
4. surveys and studies have documented that abusive work 
environments can have serious consequences for employers, including 
reduced employee productivity and morale, higher turnover and 
absenteeism rates, and significant increases in medical and workers’ 
compensation claims; 
5. unless mistreated employees have been subjected to abusive 
treatment at work on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, or age, 
they are unlikely to have legal recourse to redress such treatment; 
6. legal protection from abusive work environments should not be 
limited to behavior grounded in protected class status as that provided for 
under employment discrimination statutes; and, 
7. existing workers’ compensation plans and common-law tort actions 
are inadequate to discourage this behavior or to provide adequate redress to 
employees who have been harmed by abusive work environments. 
 
 131. David C. Yamada, Crafting a Legislative Response to Workplace Bullying, 8 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 475, 517-21 (2004). 
CHAPLINFINALIZED_FOUR 3/31/2010  2:03:42 AM 
468 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:2 
 
B. LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE 
It is the purpose of this Chapter: 
1. to provide legal redress for employees who have been harmed, 
psychologically, physically, or economically, by being deliberately 
subjected to abusive work environments; 
2. to provide legal incentive for employers to prevent and respond to 
mistreatment of employees at work. 
 
SECTION 2—DEFINITIONS 
 
1. Employee.  An employee is an individual employed by an 
employer, whereby the individual’s labor is either controlled by the 
employer and/or the individual is economically dependent upon the 
employer in return for labor rendered. 
2. Employer.  An employer includes individuals, governments, 
governmental agencies, corporations, partnerships, associations, and 
unincorporated organizations that compensate individuals in return for 
performing labor. 
3. Abusive work environment.  An abusive work environment exists 
when the defendant, acting with malice, subjects the complainant to 
abusive conduct so severe that it causes tangible harm to the complainant. 
a. Conduct.  Conduct is defined as all forms of behavior, including 
acts and omissions of acts. 
b. Malice.  For purposes of this Chapter, malice is defined as the 
desire to see another person suffer psychological, physical, or economic 
harm, without legitimate cause or justification.  Malice can be inferred 
from the presence of factors such as:  outward expressions of hostility; 
harmful conduct inconsistent with an employer’s legitimate business 
interests; a continuation of harmful, illegitimate conduct after the 
complainant requests that it cease or demonstrates outward signs of 
emotional or physical distress in the face of the conduct; or attempts to 
exploit the complainant’s known psychological or physical vulnerability. 
c. Abusive conduct.  Abusive conduct is conduct that a reasonable 
person would find hostile, offensive, and unrelated to an employer’s 
legitimate business interests.  In considering whether abusive conduct is 
present, a trier of fact should weigh the severity, nature, and frequency of 
the defendant’s conduct.  Abusive conduct may include, but is not limited 
to:  repeated infliction of verbal abuse such as the use of derogatory 
remarks, insults, and epithets; verbal or physical conduct that a reasonable 
person would find threatening, intimidating, or humiliating; or the 
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gratuitous sabotage or undermining of a person’s work performance.  A 
single act normally will not constitute abusive conduct, but an especially 
severe and egregious act may meet this standard. 
d. Tangible harm.  Tangible harm is defined as psychological harm or 
physical harm. 
i. Psychological harm.  Psychological harm is the material impairment 
of a person’s mental health, as documented by a competent psychologist, 
psychiatrist, or psychotherapist, or supported by competent expert evidence 
at trial. 
ii. Physical harm.  Physical harm is the material impairment of a 
person’s physical health or bodily integrity, as documented by a competent 
physician or supported by competent expert evidence at trial. 
4. Negative employment decision.  A negative employment decision is 
a termination, demotion, unfavorable reassignment, refusal to promote, or 
disciplinary action. 
5. Constructive discharge.  A constructive discharge shall be 
considered a termination, and, therefore, a negative employment decision 
within the meaning of this Chapter.  For purposes of this Chapter, a 
showing of constructive discharge requires that the complainant establish 
the following three elements:  (a) abusive conduct existed; (b) the 
employee resigned because of that abusive conduct; and, (c) prior to 
resigning, the employee brought to the employer’s attention the existence 
of the abusive conduct and the employer failed to take reasonable steps to 
correct the situation. 
SECTION 3—UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice under this Chapter to 
subject an employee to an abusive work environment as defined by this 
Chapter. 
SECTION 4—EMPLOYER LIABILITY 
An employer shall be vicariously liable for an unlawful employment 
practice, as defined by this Chapter, committed by its employee. 
SECTION 5—DEFENSES 
A. It shall be an affirmative defense for an employer only that: 
 
1. the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct 
promptly any actionable behavior; and, 
2. the complainant employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of 
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appropriate preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the 
employer. 
This defense is not available when the actionable behavior culminates 
in a negative employment decision. 
 
B. It shall be an affirmative defense that: 
 
1. the complaint is grounded primarily upon a negative employment 
decision made consistent with an employer’s legitimate business interests, 
such as a termination or demotion based on an employee’s poor 
performance; or, 
2. the complaint is grounded primarily upon a defendant’s reasonable 
investigation about potentially illegal or unethical activity. 
SECTION 6—RETALIATION 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice under this Chapter to 
retaliate in any manner against an employee because she has opposed any 
unlawful employment practice under this Chapter, or because she has made 
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation or proceeding under this Chapter, including, but not limited 
to, internal complaints and proceedings, arbitration and mediation 
proceedings, and legal actions. 
SECTION 7—RELIEF 
1. Relief generally.  Where a defendant has been found to have 
committed an unlawful employment practice under this Chapter, the court 
may enjoin the defendant from engaging in the unlawful employment 
practice and may order any other relief that is deemed appropriate, 
including, but not limited to, reinstatement, removal of the offending party 
from the complainant’s work environment, back pay, front pay, medical 
expenses, compensation for emotional distress, punitive damages, and 
attorney’s fees. 
2. Employer liability.  Where an employer has been found to have 
committed an unlawful employment practice under this Chapter that did 
not culminate in a negative employment decision, its liability for damages 
for emotional distress shall not exceed $25,000, and it shall not be subject 
to punitive damages.  This provision does not apply to individually named 
co-employee defendants. 
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SECTION 8—PROCEDURES 
1. Private right of action.  This Chapter shall be enforced solely by a 
private right of action. 
2. Time limitations.  An action commenced under this Chapter must 
be commenced no later than one year after the last act that comprises the 
alleged unlawful employment practice. 
 
SECTION 9—EFFECT ON OTHER STATE LAWS 
 
1. Other state laws.  Nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to 
exempt or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or 
punishment provided by any law of the State. 
2. Workers’ compensation and election of remedies.  This Chapter 
supersedes any previous statutory provision or judicial ruling that limits a 
person’s legal remedies for the underlying behavior addressed here to 
workers’ compensation.  However, a person who believes that s/he has 
been subjected to an unlawful employment practice under this Chapter may 
elect to accept workers’ compensation benefits in connection with the 
underlying behavior in lieu of bringing an action under this Chapter.  A 
person who elects to accept workers’ compensation may not bring an action 
under this Chapter for the same underlying behavior. 
 
 
 
